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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, ] 
Pla intiff/Respondent, 
vs. ] 
DONALD CARLTON SHAMBLIN, 
Defendant/Appellant. ] 
Case No. 87-0406-CA 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS BELOW: 
I. JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction to hear the appeal in this 
matter pursuant to U.C.A., 1953, Section 78-2a-3(2)(c) (Repl 
Vol. 9, 1987 ed.) and Rule 3(a) of the Rules of the Utah Court 
of Appeals. 
II. NATURE AND PROCEEDINGS 
This Section is adopted from Appellant's Brief. 
III. ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Whether or not an inventory of a vehicle, impounded 
as required under Section 41-6-44.30, UCA 1953, as Amended 
following an arrest for a violation of Section 41-6-44, UCA 
1953, as Amended, and conducted pursuant to standard 
departmental policy with the contents of the vehicle listed on a 
standard inventory form as provided by the Utah Highway Patrol 
is per se unreasonable and violative of the owners 
constitutional rights simply because the policy of the Utah 
Highway Patrol did not mandate the opening of closed containers. 
2. Whether or not the absence of an offer to allow the 
owner an opportunity to secure the contents of the vehicle 
before the inventory and impoundment/ even though the owner 
never requested that right/ was per se unreasonable so as to 
require the suppression of any evidence found. 
3. Whether or not admissions of the Appellant 
concerning specific amounts of alcohol consumed made to the 
officer after a waiver of the Miranda Rights were admissable. 
4. Whether or not a witness admitted as an expert to 
testify on the identification and analysis of marijuana and who 
testified to having worked as a narcotics officer for several 
years was competent to testify concerning the odor of burnt 
marijuana. 
5. Whether or not the Trial Court's instructions to 
the Jury regarding the term "reasonable doubt" denied Appellant 
a fair trial. 
IV. CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
CONSIDERED DETERMINATIVE 
Fourth Amendment/ United States Constitution 
Fifth Amendment/ United States Constitution 
Fourteenth Amendment/ United State Constitution 
Article 1/ Section 7, Utah State Constitution 
Article 1/ Section 14/ Utah State Constitution 
U.C.A. Section 76-1-501(1) 
U.C.A. Section 41-6-44 
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U.C.A. Section 41-6-44.30 
V
* STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This Section is adopted from Appellant's Brief. 
VI. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
The inventory of the vehicle conducted after a valid 
arrest for a violation of Section 41-6-44/ UCA 1953/ as amended/ 
was conducted as required in Section 41-6-44.30/ UCA 1953/ as 
amended/ and General Order No. 83-10 of the Utah Highway 
Patrol/ a copy of which is attached hereto and marked Exhibit 
"A". There are no indications of any violations of Highway 
Patrol Policy or of any excessive scope of the search. There 
are no allegations of bad faith on the part of the Trooper nor 
of any suspicion of contraband that could lend creedence to 
calling this inventory a pretextual search. The mere lack of a 
specific directive mandating opening of all closed containers 
does not require the search be found to be unreasonable per se/ 
but should be one factor to be considered in determining the 
overall reasonableness of the inventory procedure. 
The police officer should not be required to ask a 
driver of a vehicle if there are any items the driver wishes to 
secure before an inventory is conducted. The U.S. Supreme Court 
has expressly stated that such is not required under the 
Constitution. 
The jury was entitled to all relevant facts concerning 
the issue of level of intoxication or ability to safely operate 
a motor vehicle and the admission of the Appellant concerning 
amount of alcohol consumed. Since it is only illegal to drink 
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and drive after a sufficient quantity of alcohol is consumed so 
as to bring the blood/alcohol level to .08% or to render the 
driver incapable of safely operating the vehicle/ the jury was 
entitled to know the amount of alcohol admittedly consumed by 
the Defendant and to draw their own conclusions therefrom. 
fEvidence adverse to the Appellant is not necessarily prejudicial 
and the Defendant was free to call his own expert if he wished 
to try to mitigate the impact. 
The expert witness called to testify concerning the 
analysis and identification of marijuana was competent to 
testify concerning all aspects of marijuana with which he was 
familiar. The testimony relating to odor of burnt marijuana is 
non-scientific in nature, requiring no special expertise other 
than prior experience with marijuna and should be admissable on 
the same basis as lay testimony on the odor of alcohol or level 
of intoxication. 
The Trial Court's instruction on reasonable doubt was 
adequate to safeguard the Appellant's Constitutional Rights and 
the Respondent submits that issue on the basis of the Amicus 
Curiae Brief submitted by the Honorable Robert F. Owens. 
VII. ARGUMENTS 
A. THE SEARCH OF THE CLOSED CONTAINERS PURSUANT TO A 
VALID INVENTORY PROCEDURE WAS REASONABLE AND CONDUCTED 
ACCORDING TO LAW AND UTAH HIGHWAY PATROL GUIDELINES. 
Appellant has made no claim that the initial stop of 
this vehicle and his subsequent arrest for DUI under Section 
41-6-44, UCA 1953, as amended, were defective in any way. 
Subsequent to the arrest, Trooper Lloyd was required by Section 
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41-6-44.30/ UCA 1953/ as amended/ to impound the vehicle unless 
the conditions enumerated in subsection (2) of that statute 
apply. In this case since no one but the Appellant was present 
in the vehicle Trooper Lloyd had no choice but to impound the 
vehicle. Prior to the impound/ Trooper Lloyd filled out a 
standard Utah Highway Patrol Vehicle Inventory Form/ a copy of 
which is attached hereto and marked Exhibit "B". The case is 
factually indistinguishable from Colorado v. Bertine/ 93 L. 
Ed. 2d. 739/ with the one exception being that in Bertine there 
was a specific policy to open and inspect closed containers 
while the Utah Highway Patrol had none. It should be noted/ 
however, that the standard inventory form provides spaces for an 
inventory of both the glove box and trunk/ areas which are 
normally closed and even locked. By implication the Utah 
Highway Patrol has therefore authorized search of closed 
containers. Regulations spelling out each type of container 
that could be searched would be unduly cumbersome and should not 
be constitutionally required. Instead/ all factors should be 
considered in the light of reasonableness to determine if any 
overreaching occurred. 
In this case, there are no indications Trooper Lloyd 
was doing anything other than carrying out his caretaker 
functions as specifically authorized under South Dakota v. 
Opperman 428 U.S. 364, 49 L. Ed. 2d. 1000/ 96 S. Ct. 3092 
(1976)/ and State v. Johnson 60 Utah Advance Reports 30 (Utah 
June 30/ 1987). There was no indication of any suspicion of the 
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presence of contraband or illegal activity such as was present 
in State v. Hygh 711 P.2d, 264, 265, (Utah, 1985), which might 
have indicated a pretextual search for evidence. The bag in 
which the contraband was found was not locked but only zipped 
shut and was found not in some secret or locked compartment/ but 
instead in the sleeper unit located immediately to the rear of 
the driver's seat and open thereto. The inventory form was 
filled out in extensive detail to the extent of listing a "roll 
of t.p./" "pillow," "water jug/" and "brown case with 39 tapes" 
to name only a few. The fact that each item of clothing in the 
suitcase or each tool in the toolbox is not listed separately 
cannot be used to imply the inventory was merely a pretextual 
search in view of the detail that is present. 
The Utah Supreme Court, in Johnson quoted with approval 
the doctrine of United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798/ 821 
(1982). 
"When a legitimate search is under way/ and when its 
purpose and its limits have been precisely defined, 
nice distinctions between.... glove compartments/ 
upholstered seats, trunks/ and wrapped packages... must 
give way to the interest in the prompt and efficient 
completion of the task at hand." 
In Johnson, the Utah Supreme Court expressly sanctioned 
an inventory search by the Los Angeles police of the trunk/ 
under the hood/ inside an unlocked jewelry box/ and in 
unwrapping a towel/ since there was no showing of bad faith on 
the part of the officers. There is no showing in the instant 
case of bad faith on the part of Trooper Lloyd and it would be 
highly anomalous to prohibit the Utah Highway Patrol from 
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performing the same activities expressly sanctioned by the Los 
Angeles Police. See also State v. Ailport, 413 N.W. 2d. 140 
(1987) and State v. Criscola/ 444 P.2d. 517 (Utah 1968). 
B. THE OFFICER WAS NOT REQUIRED TO GIVE THE APPELLANT 
AN OPPORTUNITY TO SECURE HIS PROPERTY BEFORE THE INVENTORY AND 
IMPOUND. 
While it is true that Trooper Lloyd could have given 
the Appellant an opportunity to secure his possessions before 
the inventory and impound/ there is no Constitutional 
requirement to do so. This same argument was made in Bertine 
and specifically rejected by the U.S. Supreme Court. Quoting an 
earlier decision in Lafayettef the Court stated: 
"The real reason is not what could have been achieved/ 
but whether the Fourth Amendment requires such 
steps... the reasonableness of any particular 
governmental activity does not necessarily or 
invariably turn on the existence of alternative less 
intrusive means." Bertine 93 L. Ed. 2d. 739 at 747. 
(Other citations omi tted). 
In addition/ there were specific reasons for not 
allowing the Appellant to secure his possessions. Since the 
Appellant was under the influence of alcohol at the time/ 
allowing him the climb back into the tractor could have 
endangered himself and engendered liability on the part of the 
Trooper who was by then aware of the Appellant's condition. 
Appellant1s claim while under the influence of alcohol that he 
had nothing of value may not have protected the Trooper from 
future claims of lost or stolen property/ which the use of the 
inventory could help prevent. Allowing any individual access to 
a closed bag could certainly endanger an officer who would have 
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no way of knowing whether or not a weapon was present. Also, 
valuables are often located inside small closed packages which 
made it only reasonable for the Trooper to inspect all items not 
securely locked. Finally/ Appellant offers no means by which he 
could have secured the packages in which the contraband was 
found/ since he was under arrest and certainly could not have 
taken the items into the jail. Appellant never asked for the 
right or privilege of securing his property and the Trooper 
should not be faulted for not providing the opportunity. 
C. ADMISSION OF APPELLANT'S STATEMENTS CONCERNING 
AMOUNT OF ALCOHOL CONSUMPTION WAS NOT ERROR. 
Appellant's admission of having consumed "a six pack of 
beer" were admittedly relevant to issues at trial. Appellant 
claims only that the amount was unfairly prejudicial without any 
expert corroboration as the the meaning of consuming that 
amount. The State should not be required to produce expert 
testimony based on the statements of the Appellant and possibly 
hinder its own case. The admitted consumption of alcohol by the 
Appellant would net have produced the level of intoxication 
shown by the intoxilyzer and may have cast doubt on the results 
of the intoxilyzer. Appellant was free to call his own witness 
to that end had he desired but he chose not to do so. The Jury 
sits as the determiner of fact and since it is not against the 
law to drink and drive/ they were entitled to know the admitted 
amount of consumption so that they could draw their own 
conclusions. The State's case depended on the Jury finding a 
level of .08% or greater of alcohol in the blood or an inability 
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of Appellant to safely operate the vehicle. The State was 
entitled to present all relevant evidence, with or without 
expert corroboration, and let the Jury make their decision from 
that evidence. Appellant cannot claim prejudice simply because 
the evidence was adverse to his position. He must instead 
articulate a specific unfair prejudice that sufficiently 
outweighs the probative value to the extent that it should be 
excluded under Rule 803 of the Utah Rules of Evidence. No 
compelling reasons have been advanced. 
D. TESTIMONY BY AN EXPERT CONCERNING THE ODOR OF 
BURNT MARIJUANA WAS PROPERLY ADMITTED AT TRIAL. 
Detective Dennis Rogers of the St. George Police 
Department was called by the State to give expert testimony on 
the analysis and identification of marijuana. Detective 
Rogers1 qualifications included having worked as a narcotics 
officer for several years and he testified concerning his 
familiarity with the odor of burnt marijuana. After testifying 
of his analysis of the marijuana found in Appellant's 
possession, Detective Rogers testified as to the odor of burnt 
marijuana emanating from the pipe and bong which were also found 
in Appellant's possession. This testimony was relevant to show 
Appellant's intent to possess and/or use the marijuana. Since 
the odor is a subjective opinion, based on a non-scientific 
test, it does not fall within the Frye test for admissability, 
and instead is more closely likened to lay opinion on the odor 
of alcohol, for example which is commonly accepted. Since 
Detective Rogers had worked around marijuana for several years, 
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he would have certainly been familiar with its odor and he so 
testified* No more foundation should have been required and 
Appellant certainly had the opportunity to attack the weight-or 
credibility of such evidence. 
E. THE INSTRUCTION ON "REASONABLE DOUBT" AS GIVEN BY 
THE TRIAL COURT ADEQUATELY PROTECTED THE APPELLANT'S RIGHTS. 
Although the "reasonable doubt" instruction offered by 
the Appellant has been approved by the Utah Supreme Court and 
the instruction as given in this case has not been specifically 
approved/ absent some showing the Jury was misled into accepting 
a lower standard to convict the verdict should stand. Since 
this issue has been briefed in an Amicus Curiae Brief by the 
Honorable Robert F. Owens, the Respondent concurs in the same 
and submits this issue on that basis. 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
On either Federal or State Constitutional Grounds/ the 
inventory of the vehicle as expressly allowed under both State 
and Federal Law was conducted reasonably and in accordance with 
the principles enunciated. The Trooper followed standardized 
procedures on a standarized form and there is no showing by 
evidence or implication that this inventory as conducted was a 
pretext for anything other than what it actually was/ a simple 
inventory prior to impound. The lack of a specific articulated 
policy concerning the search of closed containers should not 
invalidate the procedure per se but should only subject it to 
the test of reasonableness. Even if the Utah Highway Patrol 
Policy specifically required the search of closed containers it 
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would still be subject to the same test of reasonableness. The 
evidence regarding possession of the marijuana/ including the 
odor thereof/ was properly admitted and the decision of the Jury 
should be affirmed. 
The testimony concerning consumption of alcohol was 
highly probative to the issue of DUI and was also properly 
admitted under the Utah Rules of Evidence. The Jury Instruction 
on reasonable doubt/ adequately safeguarded Appellant's 
Constitutional Rights and the Jury Verdict/ properly arrived at/ 
should be affirmed on both counts. 
Respectfully submitted this /I/ ' day of March/ 1988. 
k BfrESTT LANGSTON / 
DEPUTY WASHINGTON C0UNTY ATTORNEY 
ATTORNEY FOR RESPONDENT 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I do hereby certify that on this JK-^ day of March/ 
1988/ I mailed a copy of the above and foregoing Brief of 
Respondent/ to G. Michael Westfall/ Gallian and Westfall/ Dixie 
State Bank Building/ One South Main Street/ P. 0. Box 367/ St. 
George, Utah 84770, 
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GENERAL ORDER NO, 83-10 
(Revised January, 1986) 
TO: All Personnel 
SUBJECT 
Handling abandoned, stolen, improperly registered 
vehicles or vehicles in hazardous condition and custodial 
care of such vehicles. 
PURPOSE 
1. To establish-procedures to be used when discovering 
abandoned, stolen, improperly registered vehicles in 
hazardous condition and the proper c-are of such 
vehicles. 
AUTHORITY 
1. Under the existing Utah statutes peace officers are 
authorized to remove and/or cause to be removed 
vehicles under the following conditions: 
a. When any vehicle is parked, stopped or standing 
c. 
d. 
e. 
£• 
on a roadway, whether attended or unattended,-
where it was practical 
(U.C.A. 41-6-101). 
to stop off the roadway 
When any vehicle is illegally left standing on 
any highway, bridge, causeway or tunnel where 
such vehicle constitutes an obstruction to 
traffic (U.C.A. 41-6-102[b ]) • 
When an /.officer has indications that the 
vehicle 'had been stolen or taken without the 
owner's consent (U.C.A. 41-6-102[c][I] and 
41-1-115). 
When a vehicle on a roadway is so disabled as 
to be a hazard to traffic and the person or 
persons in charge of such vehicle are unable to 
provide for its custody or removal (U.C.A. 
41-6-102[2]). 
When the person driving or in control of such 
vehicle is arrested for an alleged offense for 
which the officer is required by law to take a 
person immediately before a magistrate (U.C.A. 
41-6-102[c][3]). 
When the vehicle is being operated with 
improper registration (U.C.A. 41-1-115). 
General Order No, 83-10 
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g. When any manufacturer's mark or identification 
mark has been altered, defaced or obliterated 
(U.C.A. 41-1-115). 
h. When a vehicle Is found being driven on~a 
highway in unsafe mechanical condition (U.C.A. 
41-6-157). 
i. When a vehicle has been left unattended on a 
highway for more than 24 hours, it is then 
presumed to be abandoned (U.C.A. 41-6-116[10]). 
j. When a vehicle has been left unattended on 
other public or private property for more than 
seven days, it is then presumed to be abandoned 
(U.C.A. 41-6-116[10]). 
k. When removal is necessary in the interest of 
public safety because of fire, flood, storm, 
snow or other emergency reasons or for the 
safety of the vehicle and its contents. 
DEFINITIONS 
1. Towed away: When a wrecker service removes the 
vehicle for the purpose of storage or safekeeping. 
2. Impound: When a vehicle is being held for legal 
reasons and the owner must fulfill certain legal 
requirements before he regains possession. 
3. Hold-for-owneY: When a vehicle has been removed at 
the direction of an officer and the owner may regain 
possession at his discretion by assuming obligations 
incurred for towing and storage. 
4. Seized: When an officer takes custody of a vehicle 
which has been used in transporting any contraband 
items and legal ownership could be transferred to 
the State of Utah by appropriate legal action. 
5. HoId-for-evidence: When an officer takes custody of 
a venicle ana such vehicle is needed as evidence in 
any pending criminal action. 
PROCEDURE 
1. When a vehicle is taken to any police parking lot, 
impound lot or to any commercial storage lot, a 
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written inventory shall be .made of the contents of 
the vehicle. Such record >shall#1become a part of the 
case file. When custody ofjthe'^yehicle changes from 
.one person to another, the .person-.taking custody of 
the vehicle shall also assume"xustody^of the 
contents by placing his signature-on-the inventory 
list. 
When a vehicle is removed on a hold-for-owner basis, 
immediate steps shall be taken to locate- the owner 
and inform him of the location of the vehicle and 
how he may regain possession. If the owner cannot 
be located within 24 hours, the vehicle shall be 
impounded. 
When a vehicle is impounded for Driving Under the 
Influence, improper registration, stoLen or 
abandoned, the officer shall immediately complete a 
Utah State Tax Commission impound report, place the 
Commission copy in the appropriate envelope and mail 
to the State Tax Commission. After the impound 
report has been mailed, the officer shall not '* 
authorize the release of the vehicle without the 
express consent of the State Tax Commission. 
When an officer takes custody'of a vehicle for 
ho:ld-for-evidence, the officer shall cause a notice 
to* be placed on the vehicle stating that the vehicle 
is being held as evidence and also inform the 
storage lot attendant of this fact. He shall 
immediately inform the prosecuting attorney. Such 
vehicle shall be released only on approval of the 
prosecuting attorney or at the direction of the 
court. 
When a vehicle has been seized, the officer shall 
proceed as set forth in 4 above and then proceed in 
accordance with current procedure and law. 
An entry shall be made in the officer's daily log 
recording information as to location and disposition 
of all such vehicles and a separate entry with the 
same information shall become part of the case file. 
Costs of towing and storage of vehicles shall be the 
responsibility of the owner except for hold-for-
evidence and seized vehicles. In such cases 
financial arrangements for storage charges should be 
made through the prosecuting attorney. 
General Order No, 83-10 
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All vehicle keys shall remain with the vehicle and 
shall^be'surrendered to the owner or driver at the 
time"the_vehicle is released. 
METHODS-TO-BE USED 
1. Physically arrested persons 
a. In the event the driver or person in control of 
a vehicle is arrested and taken from the scene, 
the vehicle shall be under the control of the 
arresting officer and handled in the following 
manner: 
1) If permission is obtained from the owner 
or driver and if other manpower is readily 
available, the. vehicle may be driven to 
the impound lot, police parking lot or the 
owner's residence, whichever is the most 
practical, keeping in mind the safety of 
the vehicle and its contents; or 
2) The officer may have the vehicle towed 
away'on a hold-for-owner basis. The 
towing service will then assume 
responsibility for the vehicle; or 
3) The vehicle may be released to a 
responsible person designated by the 
arrestee after proper identification of 
persons and vehicle has been established, 
4) When the driver of a vehicle is arrested 
for driving under the influence the 
officer shall comply with the provisions 
of 41-6-44.30 which*says: 
"(1) If a category I Peace Officer 
arrests or cites the driver of a 
vehicle for violating 41-6-44 or 
41-6-44.10,...The officer shall seize 
and impound the vehicle except as 
provided under subsection (2). 
(2) If a registered owner of the 
vehicle, othr than the driver, is 
present at the time of the arrest, 
the officer may release the vehicle 
General Order No, 83-10 
Page 5 
.to that registered owner, but only if 
the registered owner: 
A) Requests "to remove the vehicle 
from the scene; 
B) Presents to the officer a valid 
driver license and sufficient 
identification to prove ownership of 
vehicle; 
C) Complies with all reestrictions of 
his driver license, and 
D) Would not, in the judgment of the 
officer, be in violation of Section 
41-6-44 or 41-6-44.10..., if 
permitted to operate the vehicle and 
if the vehicle itself is legally 
operable. " 
Stolen vehicle 
a. Determine if the vehicle is to be held for 
evidence by contacting the police agency 
reporting the vehicle stolen. If practical, 
act according to the request of the reporting 
agency in determining disposition. 
b. If the vehicle is not to be held and where 
reasonable and practical, request the owner 
come to^the scene and claim the vehicle. If 
.the owner is not able to respond immediately, 
the vehicle shall be towed away. 
c. If the vehicle is towed away or otherwise 
retained in custody by the officer, it shall 
immediately be impounded. 
Vehicles parked on highway 
a. Vehicles in traffic lane 
1) Have the person in charge immediately 
remove the vehi-cle to the nearest place of 
safety. If unable to do so, the vehicle 
may be immediately towed away. 
General Order No. 83-10 
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2) Take appropriate enforcement action. 
b. Vehicles on or adjacent to shoulder 
1) When an officer finds any vehicle parked 
on or adjacent to the shoulder of any 
interstate highway or any other highway 
which has a posted speed of 55 m.p.h., he 
shall take immediate steps to determine 
why the vehicle was parked at that 
location and the approximate time of its 
intended removal. If in the opinion of 
the officer the position of the vehicle 
does not constitute an obstruction of the 
normal movement of traffic, the vehicle 
may be left for a reasonable length of 
time not to exceed two hours. If in his 
opinion it does* constitute an obstruction 
to traffic, snow removal or highway 
maintenance, he may immediately have the 
vehicle towed away. 
Z) Any vehicle not in violation of subsection 
1) above left unattended for a period in 
excess of 24 hours shall be presumed to 
haye been abandoned. If, after reasonable 
attempts to have the owner remove the 
vehicle, the owner cannot or does not 
respond, the vehicle should be impounded. 
4. Vehicles parked on private property 
a. No officer shall remove or cause to be removed 
any vehicle parked on private property unless 
such vehicle has been found to have been 
stolen, abandoned or to be used for evidentiary 
purposes. A vehicle is presumed to be aban-
doned if left unattended on private property 
without the express or implied consent of the 
owner for a period in excess of seven days. 
In the event a vehicle is abandoned on private 
property, an officer should impound the vehicle 
only after having secured a signed request from 
the owner or person in lawful control of such 
property on Utah Highway Patrol Form HPF-5, 
"Request to Remove Vehicle from Private 
Property." Such request shall become part of 
the case file. 
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Vehicles on highway with improper registration 
a. Vehicle being operated with expired 
registration, 
1) Issue a uniform complaint and summons, 
2) Instruct the driver to remove the .vehicle 
from *the highway until the proper 
registration is obtained. 
b. Vehicle being operated with no registration or 
with registration issued for another person or 
vehicle. 
1) Issue a uniform complaint and summons. 
2) If in the officers opinion the violation 
is flagrant, the vehicle should be 
impounded; if it is not impounded, follow 
a.2) above. 
3) If impounded, all improper plates and 
certificate of registration -shall be 
removed and sent to the State Tax 
Commission with the impound notice. 
c. Vehicles parked with expired or no registration 
displayed. 
1) After reasonable efforts have been made to 
haye owner remove the vehicle, handle in 
the same manner as abandoned vehicles. 
Vehicles being operated in unsafe mechanical 
condition. 
a. Take appropriate enforcement action. 
b. If in the opinion of the officer the equipment 
condition is serious, the officer may issue a 
defective equipment notice in addition to any 
citation. Inform the operator that the vehicle 
may not be operated again until such defect has 
been corrected (U.C.A. 41-6-157 [b][c]). 
c» When in the opinion of the officer continued 
operation would be unreasonable and excessively 
dangerous, the officer may require the owner or 
General Order No, 83-10 
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operator to remove the vehicle by means other 
than being driven. If the vehicle is towed 
away, it may be taken to any location as 
directed by the owner or operator (U.C.A. 
41-6-157 [c]). 
REVIEW 
This order shall be reviewed before July 1, 1989. 
Effective date November 15, 1984. 
Colonel Dennis J. Nordfelt 
Superintendent 
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